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No. 20080937

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JULIE ANN OLSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

Defendant and Petitioner.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH'S OPENING BRIEF

JURISDICTION
This Court possesses jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (granting Court
jurisdiction over orders in appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board).
On December 8, 2008, this Court entered an order granting the
Department of Health's (DOH) petition for interlocutory appeal from
the denial of its motion for summary judgment. R. 177.

ISSUE PRESENTED
The Utah State Personnel Management Act defines demotion as a
"disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an employee's current
actual wage" and provides t h a t a "nondisciplinary movement of an
employee to another position without a reduction in the current actual
wage" is not a demotion. Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19"3(7)(a), (b). Here, the
district court construed the statute to provide that a transfer could be a
demotion even if it did not result in a reduction of an employee's current
actual wage if it was a "disciplinary transfer." Did the District Court
properly construe Section 67-19-3(7)?

A.

Standard of review

A district court's denial of summary judgment based on
undisputed facts constitues a ruling of law, which this Court reviews for
correctness, without deference to the district court. Estate Landscape

&

Snow Removal Specialists, Inc., v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844
P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). And this Court reviews a district court's

-2-

interpretation of a statute for correctness. Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp.,
2002 UT 44, t 8 , 48 P.3d 949.

B.

Preservation of issue
DOH raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment. R. 79,"

84-87. The district court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the
motion on October 27, 2008. R. 167-171. A copy of that order is
attached as Addendum A.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

The following statutory provision is attached as Addendum B to
this briefUtah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of
DOH's motion for summary judgment. Olson sought judicial review of
the CSRB Administrator's decision that the CSRB lacked jurisdiction
-3-

over her grievance. R. 1-22. The district court ruled that it had to
determine whether Olson's transfer was disciplinary before it concluded
whether the CSRB properly dismissed the grievance. R. 170.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Olson filed a grievance with the CSRB after DOH demoted her.
R. 31 83. But before the CSRB hearing, DOH rescinded Olson's
demotion and restored Olson to her pay level at the time of the
demotion and restored all benefits associated with the restoration of
salary, including back-pay, retirement and 401k contributions. R. 831
102. DOH also moved to dismiss the CSRB action, arguing that
because Olson suffered no reduction in "current actual pay" she was not
demoted and therefore the CSRB lacked jurisdiction over the grievance.
R. 83; 104-05.
The CSRB administrator conducted an administrative review of
the file and agreed with DOH that Olson was not demoted. R. 84 He
dismissed the case based on a lack of jurisdiction. R. 108-115. A copy of
that order is attached as Addendum C.

-4-

Olson sought judicial review with the district court. R. 1-22. DOH
filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 79-80. After full briefing and
oral argument, R. 166, the district court denied the motion on October
21, 2008. R. 167-170. DOH timely filed a petition for interlocutory
appeal, R. 178, and this Court granted the petition on December 8,
2008. R. 177.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to September 27, 2006, DOH employed Olson as the Director
of the Bureau of Managed Health Care. R. 3; 82. On July 27, 2006,
Olson received a proposed disciplinary action in the form of a demotion
dated July 19, 2006. R. 3; 82. On August 1, 2006, Olson submitted a
reply to the proposed disciplinary action and was granted a hearing
before Dr. Richard Melton regarding the proposed demotion. R. 3? 82.
On September 25, 2006, Dr. David Sundwall, DOH's Executive
Director, issued a final decision approving the discipline and instituting
a demotion. R. 3; 83. Olson was reassigned to research assistant
position and her current pay was reduced one step or eighty cents (.80)

-5-

per hour. R. 3; 83; 99-100. In October, Olson filed a request for agency
action before the CSRB challenging her demotion. R. 3; 83. The CSRB
set an evidentiary hearing on the grievance for May 22 and 23, 2007.
R. 4; 83.
Before the hearing, DOH advised Olson t h a t it was rescinding her
demotion, t h a t her one step pay decrease would be reinstated back to
September 27, 2006, and that all benefits associated with the restoration
of salary, including retirement and 401k contributions, would be
restored. R. 4; 83; 102. Olson would continue in the research assistant
position at the same pay level and with precisely the same benefits she
had enjoyed prior to the rescinded demotion. R. 83; 102.
On the same date, DOH filed a motion to dismiss the grievance
before the CSRB arguing that the CSRB lacked jurisdiction because
DOH had rescinded Olson s demotion. R. 83; 104-05. On J u n e 7, 2007,
Mr. Robert Thompson, the CSRB administrator, issued his order
dismissing the grievance because DOH's actions constituted an
administrative transfer and not a demotion since there was no loss of
any current actual wage. R. 84; 108-15. Olson appealed Administrator
Thompson's decision to the Third Judicial District Court. R. 1-22.
-6-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The CSRB correctly dismissed Olson's grievance for lack of
jurisdiction because Olson was not demoted. Section 67-19-3(7)
provides t h a t a demotion occurs only when the employee suffers a
reduction in current actual wage. DOH rescinded Olson's demotion
when it restored her pay, awarded her her back-pay, and restored all
associated retirement benefits and 401k contributions associated with
that pay. The district court erred when it construed the statute to create
an additional definition for demotion to include "disciplinary transfers"
without a reduction in current actual wage.

ARGUMENT
The CSRB has exclusive and limited administrative jurisdiction to
hear career service employees' grievances relating only to termination,
suspension or demotion. SeeXJtah Code Ann. § 67-19a-20l(l). Olson's
transfer did not constitute a termination or suspension and, therefore,

-7-

the only basis that the CSRB could have had jurisdiction over her
grievance was if her transfer was a demotion.
Thus, this case turns on the meaning of "demotion" found in Utah
Code Ann. § 67- 19-3(7)(a) (West Supp. 2008). The statute provides that:
7(a) "Demotion" means a disciplinary action resulting in a
reduction of an employee's current actual wage.
(b) "Demotion" does not mean:
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to
another position without a reduction in the current
actual wage; or
(ii) a reclassification of an employee's position under the
provisions of Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules made by
the department.
(Emphasis added).
When this Court interprets any statute, the rules of statutory
construction require the Court to look first "to the statute's plain
language, and give effect to the plain language, unless the language is
ambiguous." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at U 12. And the Court gives "effect
to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Pace v.
St George City Police Dep% 2006 UT App. 494, f 6, 153 P.3d 789.
Here, the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous. A

-8-

demotion requires a reduction in current actual pay, and without that
pay reduction, there is no demotion.
Prior to 2006, the Legislature left the term demotion undefined.
But the Department of H u m a n Recourse Management (DHRM)
promulgated rules defining demotion. The DHRM rules drew a
distinction between an involuntary transfer, which was not greivable,
and a demotion, which was. To be a demotion, the rule required that
there be a reduction in the actual current pay.
DHRM's distinction was tested in 1999 by this Court in Draughon
v. Dept of Fin. Inst,

1999 UT App. 42, 975 P.2d 935. In Draughon, the

grievant had been transferred from the position of Financial Institutions
Manager to Financial Institutions Specialist. Although grievant's
"current pay" was unchanged, the new position was arguably less
prestigious and had a lower pay range associated with it. The CSRB,
just as it did in this case, denied the grievant a hearing on the basis that
it lacked jurisdiction over what it viewed as an involuntary
administrative transfer instead of a demotion. Id. at Tf 3.
This Court reversed, finding that the Utah Personnel Management
Act did not support DHRM's definition of demotion, nor did the Act draw
-9-

the distinction between demotion and involuntary transfer found in the
DHRM rule. Id. at t l 10-11. At that time, the only section of the Act
defining demotion was § 67-19-18(1), which stated that career service
employees may be dismissed or demoted "to advance the good of the
public service" or "for just cause[s]." Id. at f 6. The Act imposed no
other clear definition of demotion, and the Draughon court fashioned its
own. The court found t h a t an involuntary transfer to a new position was
a demotion if the new position "has less status, fewer responsibilities, a
lower pay range, and will ultimately result in commensurately lower
retirement benefits" even if the grievant suffered "no immediate loss of
pay." Id at f 10.
In 2006, and with the Draughon decision before it, the Legislature
amended the Act to specifically define "demotion." Following DHRM's
rule prior to Draughon, the Legislature determined that in order to be a
"demotion," a disciplinary action must result "in a reduction of an
employee's current actual wage." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a).
The 2006 amendment also addressed and rejected the

Draughon

court's holding that a transfer resulting in a loss of duties or to a less
prestigious position, or a transfer to a position which was on a lower
-10-

wage scale, should be defined as a demotion even though no current
wages were actually lost. Pursuant to § 67-19-3(7)(b), a movement or
transfer of an employee from one position to another "without a
reduction in the current actual wage" is, by definition, a "nondisciplinary
movement" and not a demotion. By amendment, the Legislature
restored DHRM's distinction between an involuntary transfer and a
demotion.
The 2006 legislative amendment foreclosed the avenue used by the
Draughon court to define demotion. In Draughon, because there was no
legislative definition of demotion, the court took the opportunity to
construct its own. The Legislature has now filled that void, rejected the
Draughon court's definition, and defined the term "demotion" consistent
with the original DHRM rule. Simply, if there is no loss in the
employee's current actual wage, a transfer or reassignment is not a
demotion, whether disciplinary or not.
The district court below used § 67-19"3(7)(b)(i) to create its own
additional definition of demotion for what the district court called a
"disciplinary transfer" even if there was no reduction in the current
actual wage. The statute does not support such an exception. Subsection
-11-

(a) makes it clear that a "disciplinary action" can be a demotion only if it
results in a reduction of current actual wages. Subsection (b) responded
to the Draughon court's holding t h a t a transfer could be a demotion even
if it did not result in a reduction in the current actual wage, if it resulted
in a loss of duties or prestige or a shift to a different pay scale.
Subsection (b)(i) merely addresses and rejects t h a t holding. It provides
that a transfer cannot be a demotion if it is- l) nondisciplinary; and 2)
"without a reduction in the actual current wage."
The district court ignored the statute's plain language. A demotion
requires an accompanying loss of current actual pay. The district court
created an additional definition of "demotion" and thereby improperly
expanded the CSRB's limited jurisdiction.
Neither the trial court nor this Court can "ignore or strike down an
act because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom is
for the legislature to determine." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, % 22,
61 P.2d 989 (quoting Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining
Co., 113 Utah 101, 126, 119 P.2d 612 (1948)). The district court's
decision should be reversed.

-12-

CONCLUSION
The district court improperly ignored the statute's plain language
to create an additional definition of demotion. This Court should reject
the district court's faulty statutory construction and reverse the district
court's denial of DOH's motion for summary judgment.
Dated this ^

day of February, 2009.

£ . J&fasOjL,
PEGGY E. STONE
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner Utah
Department of Health
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH'S OPENING BRIEF,

y

day of February, 2009:
Nan T. Bassett
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

10 Exchange Place, 4 th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Julie Ann Olso
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to the following this

ADDENDUM A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JU
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST
JULIE ANN OLSON,
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
OTIGATIONDJVillfSi^

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.

Case No. 070910001
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendant/Respondent.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court heard oral

argument with respect to the motion on October 2, 2008.
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement.
The court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cuase
shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3

(Definitions):

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agency" means any departmenc or unit
of Utah state government with authority to
employ personnel.
(2) "Career service" means positions under
Schedule B as defined in Section 67-19-15.
(3) "Career service employee" means an
employee who has successfully completed a
probationary period of service in a position
covered oy the career service
(4) "Career service status" means scacus
granted to employees who successfully
complete probationary periods for competitive

OLSEN v. DEPT. OF HEALTH
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

career service positions
(5) "Classified service" means tnose
positions subject to the classification -and
compensation provisions of Section 67-19-12.
(6) "Controlled substance" means
controlled substance as defined in Section
58-37-2.
(7) (a) "Demotion" means a disciplinary
action resulting in a reduction of an
employee's current actual wage
(b) "Demotion" does not mean:
(I) a nondisciplinary movement of an
employee to another position without a
reduction in the current actual wage; or
(ii) a reclassification of an
employee's position under the provisions of
Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules made by the
department•
(8) "Department" means the Department of
Human Resource Management.
(9) "Disability" means a physical or
mental disability as defined and protected
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U S C
Section 12101 et seq
(10) "Employee" means any individual in a
paid status covered by tne career service or
classified service provisions of this
chapter
(11) "Examining instruments" means written
or other types of proficiency tests
(12) "Executive director," except where
otherwise specified, means the executive
director of the Department of Human Resource
Management

OLSEN v. DEPT. OF HEALTH
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

(13) "Human resource function" means those
duties and responsibilities specified
(a) under Section 67-19-6,
(b) under rules of the department, and
®) under other state or federal
statute.
(14) "Market comparability adjustment"
means a salary range adjustment determined
necessary through a market survey of salary
ranges of a reasonable cross section of
comparable benchmark positions in private and
public employment.
(15) "Probationary employee" means an
employee serving a probationary period in a
career service position but who does not have
career service status
(16) "Probationary period" means that
period of time determined by the department
that an employee serves in a career service
position as part of the hiring process before
career service status is granted to the
employee.
(17) "Probationary status" means the
status of an employee between the employee's
hiring and the granting of career service
status
(18) "Temporary employee" means career
service exempt employees on schedule AJ, AI,
or AL under Section 67 19 15
(19) "Total compensation" means salaries
and wages, bonuses, paid leave, group
insurance plans, retirement, and all other
benefits offered to state employees as
inducements to work for the state

In the instant, it is undisputed Ms

Olson was transferred

OLSEN v. DEPT. OF HEALTH

Page 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

as part of the "disciplinary action of demotion."

While it is

true that, eventually, Ms. Olson had her wage together with all
back wages restored to her, her reassignment was, nonetheless,
part of the disciplinary action.
Department

of

Fin.

Insts.,

Indeed, unlike Draughon

v.

1999 UT App 42, P2 (Utah Ct. App.

1999), where Appellant was told the involuntary reassignment was
made "to better utilize his skills," Ms, Olson was specifically
told that she was transferred as part of the disciplinary action
of demotion.

This said, the statute specifically states that a

"Demotion" does not mean " a nondisciplinary movement of an
employee to another position without a reduction in the current
actual wage."

The Court must presume the legislature used each

word advisedly and since the word "nondisciplinary" is utilized,
there is a question of fact as to whether the CSRB properly
applied the statute in this case where the movement was
disciplinary.
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is, respectfully denied.

The Court does not reach the

constitutional issues at this juncture
DATED this 7 \

day of October, 200

T COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070910001 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

NAN T BASSETT
Attorney PLA
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 4TH FLR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
GLEN E DAVIES
Attorney DEF
160 E 300 S 6TH FLR
P O BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114

Mail

Dated this /-/

!0_C£

day of

L_ i^nv^
Deputy Court Clerk
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WestlawU.CA. 1953 § 67-19-3

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 67. State Officers and Employees
K
m Chapter 19. Utah State Personnel Management Act (Refs & Annos)
-t § 67-19-3. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Agency" means any department or unit of Utah state government with authority to employ personnel.
(2) "Career service" means positions under Schedule B as defined in Section 67-19-15.
(3) "Career service employee" means an employee who has successfully completed a probationary period of service in a position covered by the career service.
(4) "Career service status" means status granted to employees who successfully complete probationary periods
for competitive career service positions.
(5) "Classified service" means those positions subject to the classification and compensation provisions of Section 67-19-12.

(6) "Controlled substance" means controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2.

(7)(a) "Demotion" means a disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an employee's current actual wage.

(b) "Demotion" does not mean:
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to another position without a reduction in the current actual
wage; or
(ii) a reclassification of an employee's position under the provisions of Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules
made by the department.
(8) "Department" means the Department of Human Resource Management.

(9) "Disability" means a physical or mental disability as defined and protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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(10) "Employee" means any individual in a paid status covered by the career service or classified service provisions of this chapter.

(11) "Examining instruments" means written or other types of proficiency tests.

(12) "Executive director," except where otherwise specified, means the executive director of the Department of
Human Resource Management.

(13) "Human resource function" means those duties and responsibilities specified:
(a) under Section 67-19-6;
(b) under rules of the department; and
(c) under other state or federal statute.
(14) "Market comparability adjustment" means a salary range adjustment determined necessary through a market survey of salary ranges of a reasonable cross section of comparable benchmark positions in private and public employment.

(15) "Probationary employee" means an employee serving a probationary period in a career service position but
who does not have career service status.

(16) "Probationary period" means that period of time determined by the department that an employee serves in a
career service position as part of the hiring process before career service status is granted to the employee.
(17) "Probationary status" means the status of an employee between the employee's hiring and the granting of
career service status.
(18) "Temporary employee" means career service exempt employees on schedule A J, AI, or AL under Section
67-19-15.
(19) "Total compensation" means salaries and wages, bonuses, paid leave, group insurance plans, retirement,
and all other benefits offered to state employees as inducements to work for the state.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1979, c. 139, § 9; Laws 1983, c. 332, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 113, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 122, § 15; Laws 1990, c.
280, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 204, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 130, § L eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 192, § 1, eff. April
29, 1996; Laws 2002, c. 7, § 1, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 181, § 22, eff. July 1, 2006; Laws 2006, c.
139, §24, eff. July 1,2006.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 67-19-3, UT ST § 67-19-3
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No claim to ong. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM C

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JULIE ANN OLSON,
Grievant,

UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH,
Agency.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF
THE FILE PURSUANT TO
SUBSECTION 67-19a-403(2)(b)(ii),
AND
FINAL AGENCY ACTION
BY INFORMAL
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING
Case No- J.IL 163

On October 23, 2006, Nan E. Bassett (Ms. Bassett), Attorney at Law, filed a Request for
Agency Action (Appeal) with the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) on behalf of Julie Ann
Olson (Grievant) requesting that the Utah Department of Health's (Department) decision to move
Grievant from her position as a Program Manager in the Bureau of Managed Health Care 1 to a
position of Research Consultant HI with a simultaneous 1 -step salary decrease be reviewed at Step 5
of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures for career service employees. Grievant is appealing
to the CSRB a final decision signed by David N. Sundwall, M.D. (Exec. Dir. Sundwall) effective
September 27, 2006. After receiving Grievant 5 s timely appeal of the Department's final decision,
the CSRB Administrator noticed a prehearing conference to be held November 15, 2006. 2
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
On Tuesday, November 2 1 , 2006, the parties met with the CSRB Administrator in a
prehearing/scheduling conference (PHC). Grievant was represented at this PHC by Ms. Bassett. The
Department was represented by Assistant Utah Attorney General Timothy D. Evans (Mr. Evans). 3
At this PHC, the parties mutually agreed on dates to exchange witness lists and documents expected

1

The Bureau of Managed Health Care is a division organizationally located in the Utah Department
of Health.
2

Based upon scheduling conflicts with the parties, this prehearing/scheduling conference was
rescheduled to November 21, 2006.
3

At this PHC, Mr. Evans indicated that Assistant Utah Attorney General Glen E. Davies (Mr. Davies)
would be representing the Department in any further proceedings in this matter.

108

to be used at any evidentiary hearing in this matter. The parties also agreed to hold a status
conference on Friday, March 2,2007, to determine the parties' readiness for an evidentiary hearing.
On Friday, March 2,2007, a status/prehearing conference was held. During this conference,
the parties mutually agreed to hold a Step 5 evidentiary hearing in this matter on Tuesday, May 22,
and Wednesday, May 23,2007. Thereafter, on Wednesday, May 16,2007, the Department filed with
the CSRB a Motion to Dismiss (Motion) on the basis that the CSRB no longer had jurisdiction over
this matter. This Motion was based on the fact that the Department had elected to "rescind the
demotion of Grievant by reinstating her salary . . . together with all retirement benefits associated
with that salary" retroactive to September 27, 2006, the date Grievant's loss of salary became
effective.
Specifically addressing this matter in its Motion, the Department argued:
With the reinstatement of the salary, the action of the Department no longer
constitutes a demotion under § 67-19-3(7) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and
the CSRB therefore has no jurisdiction over what is now effectively simply an
administration transfer.
(Motion at 2)
On May 25,2007, Grievant filed an Opposition of Julie Ann Olson to Respondent's

Motion

to Dismiss (Opposition Memorandum). In her Opposition Memorandum, Grievant argues that even
with the restoration of her former actual wage, back pay and benefits, the Department's actions
constitute a demotion under Utah law. In making this argument, Grievant first argues that because
her current position has lower maximum salary range, she had been demoted. This is true Grievant
argues regardless of the Department's restoration of her former actual wage with back pay and
benefits. Summarizing this argument, Grievant argues that salary range "cannot be separated from
an hourly pay rate when considering c actual wageY' (Opposition Memorandum at 3) 4 Second,
4

This argument is essentially a restatement of the argument previously presented in Draughon v.
Dep't of Financial Institutions etal(915 P.2d935 (Ut. Ct. App. (1999)) wherein Draughon was reassigned
to a position having a lower salary range with no reduction in his current actual wage. The then administrator
of the CSRB dismissed Draughon's appeal to the CSRB finding he had not been demoted as that term was
defined under Utah Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rules. After appeal to the courts,
the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Draughon had been demoted even though DHRM rules defined demotion
as requiring a loss of wage. It is important to note that these Draughon decisions, both at the CSRB and at the
Utah Court of Appeals, have little application to the present case in that the statute at issue in the Draughon
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Grievant argues that her reassignment was a demotion because it was initiated for disciplinary
purposes. (Id.) Grievant argues that her reassignment under these circumstances constitutes a
demotion because the statutory definition of demotion also provides:
(b)
"Demotion" does not mean:
(i)
a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to another position without a
reduction in the current actual wage;
(Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(b)(I))
Third, Grievant argues her reassignment to a position to having a lower salary range without
a reduction in her current actual wage violated Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3.1 which requires DHRM
to establish a career service system providing, among other things, equitable and competitive
compensation for State employees and fair treatment in all aspects of human resource administration.
Grievant argues that her reassignment to a position having a lower maximum salary rate violates
these principles. Finally, Grievant argues that dismissal of her appeal at this time would implicate
due process protections in that she would be effectively deprived of the "opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (Citing V-l Oil Co. v. Department

of

Environmental Quality, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997).)5
JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW
Utah Admin. Code R137-l-I7(l) provides that:
(1)

Procedural Issues. The administrator shall determine the
following: timeliness, standing, direct harm,jurisdiction, and
eligibility of the issues to be advanced, and any other
procedural matter or jurisdictional controversies according to
[Utah Code Ann.] Sections 67-19a-403 and 67-19a-404.
(Emphasis added)

decisions was entirely devoid of any legislative definition regarding demotion.
5

In support of this argument, Grievant argues that the parties have known the hearing date since
November 21, 2006, pursuant to a prehearing conference. Review of the administrative file maintained and
controlled by the CSRB establishes that no hearing was set at the initial prehearing conference held on
November 21, 2006. Instead, the administrative file establishes that the hearing date was not set until Friday,
March 2, 2007, when the parties participated in a second prehearing or status conference with the CSRB
Administrator. At that time, the parties mutually agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing in this matter on
Tuesday, May 22, and Wednesday, May 23, 2007.
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Specifically addressing these procedural issues, Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-17(6) provides
that:
The administrator may, pursuant to an administrative review of the
procedural facts and circumstances of a grievance case, summarily
dispose of a case on the ground that:
* * *

(f) the issue grieved does not qualify to be advanced beyond step 4;
These administrative rules are in consonance with Utah Code that affirmatively requires the
CSRB Administrator to make jurisdictional determinations. Specifically, Utah Code

Ann.

§ 67-l9a-403(2)(a) provides that:
(2) (a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator
under the authority of Section 67-19a-403, the administrator shall
determine:

(b)

(i)

whether or not the employee is a career service
employee and is entitled to use the grievance system;

(ii)

whether or not the board has jurisdiction
grievance;

(iii)

whether or not the employee has been directly
harmed; and

(iv)

the issues to be heard.

over the

In order to make the determinations required by Subsection
(2), the administrator may:
(i)

hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may
present oral arguments, written arguments, or both; or

(ii)

conduct an administrative review of the file.

(Emphasis added)
Based upon these statutory and administrative requirements, I have conducted an
administrative review of the file. An administrative review of the file is an informal adjudicative
proceeding under Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-4 and Utah Admin Code Rl 37-1 -17. Based upon these
facts, the decision set forth herein is appealable to the district court that has jurisdiction to review
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by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings ( Utah Code
Ann, § 63-46b-15) {Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 Utah Ct. App. 1990)
DISCUSSION
An administrative review of the file in the instant case establishes that effective
September 27,2006, the Department assigned Grievant to a position within the Department that had
a lower maximum salary range from the one she held prior to this new assignment. (Request for
Agency Action, Ex. A-1) 6 In addition to assigning Grievant to a different position, the Department
also reduced Grievant's actual wage from $29.92 per hour to $29.12 per hour. These departmental
actions were formalized in Exec. Dir. SundwalFs written decision dated September 25, 2006, and
became effective September 27,2006. As set forth above, on May 16,2007, the Department notified
Grievant by letter that they were modifying their previous decision dated September 25,2006. This
May 16, 2007 letter was signed by A. Richard Melton, Deputy Director of the Department and
specifically provided as follows:
David N. Sundwall, Executive director of the Department of health, has
designated me as the Acting Director to advise you that the Department has
concluded . . . to rescind your demotion and to reinstate your salary from a Step 66
- $29.12 per hour to a Step 67 - $29.92 per hour retroactive back to September 27,
2006, the effective date of the prior demotion. This will include the retroactive
reinstatement of all retirement benefits based upon the higher salary.
(Attachment to Motion to Dismiss)
As a result of these events, the Department moved to dismiss Grievant's appeal before the
CSRB arguing that because Grievant had not been demoted as that term is defined in Utah Code
Ann § 67-19-3(7), the CSRB lacks jurisdiction to review and decide Grievant's appeal and must
therefore dismiss this action.
As contemplated by statute, my obligation as CSRB Administrator is to determine "whether
or not the Board has jurisdiction over the grievance." {Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a)(ii)) This
determination is governed by Utah law which limits the Board's jurisdiction to "appeals from career
service employees . . . of decisions about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written

6

Gnevant's Request for Agency Action was part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB
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reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable
administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning the abandonment of position
. . ." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-2G2(l)(a), 67-19a-302(l) (Emphasis added) The CSRB has no
jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(b))
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3 (7)(a) defines demotion as "a disciplinary action resulting in a
reduction of an employee's current actual wage." This same section further provides that demotion
does not mean "a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to another position without a reduction
in the current actual wage," (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a)(b)(ii)) Moreover, DHRM rule
R477-l(3l) defines demotion as a "disciplinary action resulting in a reduction in an employee's
actual current wage,"
After carefully reviewing these statutory provisions and administrative rules regarding
demotion of a career service employee, it is clear that Grievant has not been demoted as that term
is defined by law. In the instant case, an administrative review of the file establishes that while
Grievant has in fact been placed in a position having a lower maximum salary range, this placement
ultimately has not resulted in a reduction in her "current actual wage." (Emphasis added) This
conclusion is necessitated by the Department's retroactive restoration of Grievant's salary and
corresponding benefits. Absent a reduction in Grievant's current actual wage, there is simply no
demotion under a plain reading of State law.
Moreover, I am not persuaded by Grievant's argument that the Department's placement of
Grievant in a position with a lesser "number of steps before her hourly rate would max out"
constitutes a demotion, 7 In reaching this conclusion, I rely upon the statutory provisions from which
a career service employee's protected rights derive. These statutory provisions clearly protect career
service employees against, and allow the CSRB jurisdiction to review, agency disciplinary actions
that result in a reduction of an employee's "current actual wage." Nowhere do these same statutes
create an interest against or give the CSRB the right to review movements, reassignments or transfers

7

On page 3 of her Opposition Memorandum, Grievant states that asaresultof the Department's actions
"the current wage Julie was earning as a director carried with it a greater number of steps before her hourly rate
would max out." This argument inherently recognizes that the Department's placement of Grievant in a
Research Consultant III position resulted in a lesser number of steps avai iable to Grievant before her "hourly
rate" would max out.
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of career service employees whose current actual wage has not been reduced. This is true regardless
of the motivation generating the Department's decision to move, reassign or transfer such an
employee. Absent specific statutory protections shielding against these movements, the CSRB
simply has no jurisdiction to review or decide the appropriateness of these movements because they
are simply not a "demotion" as that term is lucidly defined by statute. (See Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19a-202 and 67-19-3(7)(a))
While it is clear in the instant case that the Department's initial movement of Grievant to the
Research Consultant i n position was a demotion because it was accompanied by a reduction in
Grievant's "current actual wage,' 7 this demotion has been "rescinded 5 ' not only by the clear language
of the Department's May 16,2007 letter, but also by the Department's retroactive reinstatement of
Grievant's former actual wage and corresponding benefits.
Moreover, even assuming the Department's decision to move or reassign Grievant was for
disciplinary purposes, such action by the Department does not amount to a "demotion" as defined
by statute. As stated previously, absent a reduction in the employee's "current actual wage," there
is simply no demotion over which the CSRB had jurisdiction. In addition, DHRM rule contemplates
that positions may be filled by transferring or reassigning employees as long as such transfers or
reassignments do not include a reduction in the employee's current actual wage. {Utah Admin,
Code R 477-4-6(1)) Absent a specific statutory provision guarding against the actions taken by the
Department in this case, the Board simply has no jurisdiction to reviewor decide Grievant's appeal.
Finally, I do not find the Department's actions in this case implicate DHRM's requirement
of providing equitable and competitive compensation in connection with its establishment of a career
service system. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the "system" assigning the salary range
to the Department's Research Consultant III position is inequitable or noncompetitive. Moreover,
the CSRB is jurisdictionally unqualified to determine whether or not the system established by
DHRM or the Department's actions in relation to that system allow for fair treatment of applicants
or employees. Finally, the CSRB also lacks jurisdiction to decide whether DHRM has met its
statutory mandate to establish and implement a career service system. While there may be an avenue
to review whether DHRM has adequately designed and provided a system implementing these career
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service principles, it is not at the CSRB whose jurisdiction is limited by Utah Code
Ann.§ 67-19a-202 etseq.

DECISION
After thoroughly reviewing the file associated with this grievance and carefully considering
the motions and memoranda on file in connection with the Department's Motion to Dismiss, I find
the CSRB no longer has jurisdiction to review or adjudicate this appeal. Utah law specifically limits
the CSRB's jurisdiction to the review and consideration of demotions of career service employees.
In the instant case, Grievant was not demoted as that term is defined by statute. Based upon these
factors, Grievant's appeal before the CSRB is dismissed with prejudice.
It is so ORDERED this 7th day of June 2007.

Robert W. Thompson
Administrator
RECONSIDERATION
This administrative review of the file constitutes final agency action under Utah Code, §63-46b-13t Utah
Administrative Procedures Act. A party may request reconsideration by the Administrator of the Career Service
Review Board within 20 days from the date of issuance (i.e., signature date), by stating specific grounds upon
which relief is requested.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of an administrative review of the file under §67-19a-403(2)(b)(ii) is reviewable in District
Court according to Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and 15. The appealing party of this informal adjudication and final
agency action may file with either The District Court in which the party resides or The Third District Court
where the seat of state of Utah government is located.
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